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ABSTRACT
BGP prefix hijacking is a threat to Internet operators and
users. Several mechanisms or modifications to BGP that pro-
tect the Internet against it have been proposed. However,
the reality is that most operators have not deployed them
and are reluctant to do so in the near future. Instead, they
rely on basic - and often inefficient - proactive defenses to
reduce the impact of hijacking events, or on detection based
on third party services and reactive approaches that might
take up to several hours. In this work, we present the results
of a survey we conducted among 75 network operators to
study: (a) the operators’ awareness of BGP prefix hijacking
attacks, (b) presently used defenses (if any) against BGP pre-
fix hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mech-
anisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of
BGP prefix hijacking defenses.We expect the findings of this
survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijack-
ing defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as
contribute towards designing new defense mechanisms that
satisfy the requirements of the operators.
1 INTRODUCTION
BGP prefix hijacking 101. Autonomous Systems (ASes)
use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [15] to advertise
address space (as IPv4/IPv6 network prefixes) and establish
inter-domain routes in the Internet. BGP is a distributed pro-
tocol, lacking authentication of advertised routes. As a re-
sult, an AS is able to advertise illegitimate routes for IP pre-
fixes it does not own. These advertisements propagate and
“pollute” many ASes, or even the entire Internet, affecting
service availability, integrity, and confidentiality of commu-
nications. This phenomenon, called BGP prefix hijacking, is
frequently observed [25], and can be caused by router mis-
configurations [1, 2] or malicious attacks [3, 22, 25].
Current defenses are not sufficient.Currently, networks
rely on practical reactive mechanisms to defend against pre-
fix hijacking, since proactive mechanisms such as RPKI [16–
19, 24] are fully efficient only when globally deployed, and
operators are reluctant to deploy them due to associated
technical and financial costs [11,12,14,20,21]. Reactivemech-
anisms mainly operate in two stages: detection (e.g., based
on monitoring data) and mitigation (e.g., based on local net-
work actions, such as originating BGP advertisements) of
the hijack. The speed of the reactive defenses is crucial; even
short-lived events can have severe consequences [3]. How-
ever, the reality shows that, currently, hijacking events are
not quicklymitigated. For instance, back in 2008, a hijacking
event affected YouTube’s prefixes and disrupted its services
for 2 hours [9]. More recently, in Sep. 2016, BackConnect
(AS203959) hijacked, at different times, several ASes; the
events lasted for several hours [4]. In Jan. 2017, the Iranian
state telecom TIC hijacked disparate pornographic websites
for more than a day [5]. In Apr. 2017, financial services, like
Visa and Mastercard, and security companies, like Syman-
tec, were hijacked by a Russian company for seven min-
utes [6].
Survey motivation and contributions. To surpass exist-
ing shortcomings and achieve a swift and efficient resolu-
tion of hijacking events, new defense approaches that fit the
needs and requirements of the operators are needed. To this
end, we launched a survey [8] to increase the understand-
ing of currently used BGP hijacking defenses, and to receive
feedback directly from network operators about their needs.
The main motivation for this survey was to propose and
design such a defense approach that matches the commu-
nity needs; in fact, we acquired valuable information from
this survey that helped us design a defense system called
ARTEMIS [23].
However, the findings of the survey are more general and
can be beneficial for both researchers and operators. Researchers
can evaluate the severity of the problem of BGP prefix hi-
jacking as it is seen from the operator community, and in-
vestigate new defense mechanisms capitalizing on current
operational practices. Operators can be informed about the
trends in the BGP prefix hijacking issue and the employed
defenses, provide valuable feedback to the network commu-
nity themselves, and adjust accordingly the way they man-
age and protect their networks against hijacks.
Structure. In Section 2 we present the questions of the sur-
vey, and in Section 3 we discuss the main findings and their
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implications. The detailed results are presented in Figures 1, 2,
and 3.
2 SURVEY PROFILE AND QUESTIONS
We launched a survey [8] on network operators’ mailing
lists, such as NANOG and RIPE. The survey is anonymous
and comprises 21 questions studying (a) the operators’ aware-
ness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks, (b) presently used de-
fenses against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the willingness to
adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may
hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses. We
received answers from 75 participants operating a broad va-
riety of networks (Fig. 1(a)) all over the world (Figs. 1(b)
and 1(c)), working at different positions (Fig. 1(d)).
The survey/questionnaire is composed of three parts.
(1) Information about the participants and their orga-
nizations (4 questions). In the first part we ask the partici-
pants to provide information about the type (e.g., ISP, CDN,
IXP) and location of their organization, as well as their work
position in the organization. The questions and results are
presented in Fig. 1.
(2) Knowledge andExperiencewithBGPPrefixHijack-
ing (6 questions). The second part consists of questions re-
lated to the participants’ awareness and concern about BGP
prefix hijacking, including their experience with past hijack-
ing events on their networks. The questions and results are
presented in Fig. 2.
(3) Defenses against BGPPrefixHijacking (11 questions).
The last part asks the participants about (i) the defenses
they use (if any) against BGP prefix hijacking, such as RPKI,
(ii) how they detect and mitigate a hijacking event affect-
ing their prefixes, and (iii) the characteristics they consider
desirable (or not) in a future defense (detection/mitigation)
system. The questions and results are presented in Fig. 3.
3 SURVEY RESULTS
We classify the survey findings in 4 categories, which we
present in the following sections: (i) evaluation of impact of
hijacks (Section 3.1), (ii) general information about current
defense mechanisms employed against hijacks (Section 3.2),
(iii) specific information on the detection andmitigation stages
in today’s operations (Section 3.3), and (iv) requirements
posed on new mitigation mechanisms (e.g., involving out-
sourcing defense functionality to third parties), as well as
the willingness of operators to adopt them (Section 3.4).
3.1 Impact of Hijacks
BGP prefix hijacking is a real threat and concerns net-
work operators.More than 40% of the operators reported
that their organization has been a victim of a hijack in the
past (Fig. 2(e)). However, the vast majority is concerned about
BGP prefix hijacking in the Internet (Fig. 2(b)) and its po-
tential impact on their own networks (Fig. 2(c)). Almost all
operators are knowledgeable on the issue of hijacks and the
involved mechanisms (Fig. 2(b)).
Hijackshave a severe and lasting impact.Operators eval-
uate the impact of a potential hijack targeting their network
(in terms of duration and number of disrupted services) as
shown in Fig. 2(d). The vast majority (76%) expects the im-
pact of a hijack to last for a long time (few hours or more),
while opinions are divided on whether the hijack will af-
fect a few or many of their services/clients, indicating that
there are concerns both for extended (e.g., route leaks) and
limited/targeted (e.g., malicious attacks) hijacks. Moreover,
their past experience (Fig. 2(f)) shows that most hijacks in-
deed lasted long: more than 57% of hijacks lasted more than
an hour, while 25% lasted more than a day; around 28% are
short-term hijacks, lasting a few minutes (14.3%) or seconds
(14.3%).
3.2 Defenses against Hijacks
RPKI deployment is limited. In accordancewith previous
studies [13], most of the network operators (71%) answered
that they have not deployed RPKI as a proactive defense
mechanism in their networks (Fig. 3(a)); very few (12%) use
the full functionality of RPKI (Route Origin Authorisation
- ROA and Route Origin Validation - ROV). There are vari-
ous reasons for this, as shown in Fig. 3(b); deployment lags
mainly due to RPKI’s limited adoption and little security ben-
efits, but also due to the increased CAPEX and OPEX costs,
and increased complexity and processing overhead associated
with the protocol mechanisms. Therefore, about 60% of the
operators (Fig. 3(c)) resort to other mechanisms and practi-
cal defenses to protect their networks against BGP hijacks.
Practical defenses include routefiltering, extensive peer-
ing, and de-aggregation. The responses to the (optional)
question “what other defense mechanisms are used by net-
works” are shown in Fig. 3(d). The majority of the partici-
pants, i.e., 17 networks (among those who provided answers
for this optional question), use route filtering as a proactive
defense to protect their own and their customers’ prefixes
from being hijacked. Route filtering is implemented in var-
ious ways (based on their answers) including for example:
prefix origin (e.g., from IRR records) or AS-path filtering; fil-
tering at edge routers (with customers/peers) or route servers
(at IXPs). Less popular approaches are anycast (2 answers)
and prefix de-aggregation (4 answers). Finally, 5 operators
(fromCDNs or tier-1 networks) mention that they peer with
many other networks extensively; this helps them protect
their networks from hijacking events (i.e., by reducing their
impact).
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3.3 Detection and Mitigation of Hijacks.
Hijack detectionmainly relies on third parties.Thema-
jority of networks (61.3%) use a third party detection ser-
vice, which notifies them about hijacking incidents against
their prefixes (Fig. 3(e)). BGPmon [7] is the most popular
detection service, according to Fig 3(f). The satisfaction of
operators from third parties generally varies a lot; some use
them because they are satisfied and others because there
are no alternatives (e.g., it is not possible to develop their
own detection service)1. Moreover, 17.3% of networks also
practically rely on third parties, since they expect to get noti-
fied about a hijack by receiving notification from colleagues,
clients, mailing lists, etc. In total, 78.6% of the networks rely
on third parties for the detection of hijacks against their pre-
fixes. About one third of the networks have deployed a local
hijack detection mechanism (e.g., by monitoring the disrup-
tion of their services)2. Finally, a non-negligible percentage
of 8% would probably not learn about a hijack.
Mitigating throughde-aggregationand contactingother
networks. Asking operators what would be the counter-
measures they would take to mitigate a prefix hijacking3,
the majority (62.7%; Fig. 3(g)) responded that they would
announce more specific prefixes (de-aggregation) and con-
tact the offending network (i.e., the hijacker) or its providers.
5.3%would follow only the former approach (de-aggregation)
and 25.3% only the latter (contacting other operators). This
indicates that although de-aggregation is not widely used
currently (see Fig. 3(d)), operators still find it a good solu-
tion and are willing to proceed to similar actions after a hi-
jacking event–affecting their–networks has taken place.
3.4 New Mitigation Mechanisms
The survey results show that the main practices that net-
works currently use for hijackmitigation comprise prefix de-
aggregation and contacting other networks (Figs. 3(d) and 3(g)).
Since these approaches have some important shortcomings,
e.g., de-aggregation is not efficient when a /24 prefix is hi-
jacked (due to upstream filtering), and contacting network
operators is usually done manually and thus adds signifi-
cant delay to the mitigation process, we ask the network
1This variation can be observed in the following examples from the detailed
answers in our survey:
“pretty happy with it”, “no issues so far”, “it works fine [..], but is relatively
limited”, “I hate it”, “It’s ok”, “ it seems to work quite well the few times I have
needed it”, “Better than nothing, but a lot of false alerts”, “It rules!”, “It is very
noisy because it does not know a damn thing about IXP route servers”, “Not
great”.
2Among the “other” answers, a high percentage of answers relates to the ob-
servation of -or, reception of complaints about- disruption in their services.
3Note that for this question, we provided the choices, based on the answers
received in a preliminary version of our survey; operators could have an-
swered in a different way if this was a completely open question.
operators about their willingness to deploy new mitigation
mechanisms, as well as what desired characteristics these
mechanisms should possess.
We first ask them about their willingness to outsource
functions related to the detection and mitigation of hijacks
to a third party, in order to enhance their defenses. 61% of
the operators are not willing to proceed to such outsourc-
ing practices (Fig. 3(h)). This shows that a potential mech-
anism should not be entirely based on outsourcing, since
this would not be acceptable by many networks. Flexible
approaches that could be operated in two modes, i.e., self-
operated and outsourced, could be promising, since a sig-
nificant percentage of 39% does not reject the possibility to
outsource such functions.
The reasons for the operators’ reluctance to outsource
are given in Fig. 3(i), where the associated (high) cost and
the need to share private information about their network
are the main factors. Administrative and technical overhead
may also prevent outsourcing. This is a first indication about
the characteristics of a potential defense system: low cost,
privacy-preserving, and easy to operate and manage.
More specific results about what would be the informa-
tion/control that they would not be willing to share/allow
with an outsourcing organization, are given in Fig. 3(j). As
it can be seen, most of them are willing to share informa-
tion about their prefixes and AS-neighbors (95%), as well as
their routing policies (80%). A smaller percentage would al-
low BGP announcements to be controlled or implemented
by the outsourcing organization.
Finally, according to operators, the importance of differ-
ent characteristics that a hijack defense system should have,
is shown in Fig. 3(l) (ranked from the highest to the lowest
importance). A graphical representation of the importance
of these characteristics for the network operators is given
in Fig. 3(k), where the rightmost characteristics are consid-
ered of the highest importance. The speed and effectiveness
of the mitigation stage, as well as the self-operability and
low cost and management overhead, are the highest-ranked
characteristics. Moreover, the detection stage is required to
generate few false positives, which indicates the need for
high levels of detection accuracy.
4 CONCLUSION
In this work, to increase community understanding of ex-
isting BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network op-
erators, we presented the results of a survey of 75 network
operators around the world.
Through the survey, we verified our intuition that BGP
prefix hijacking is a real threat and concerns the vast major-
ity of network operators; in fact, hijacks can have a severe
and lasting impact on their own networks. In the context of
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combatting such hijacks, operators can use proactive or re-
active techniques. On the one hand, proactive mechanisms,
such as RPKI, have gained extremely little traction for mul-
tiple reasons, including limited adoption and high cost and
complexity of deployment. On the other hand, practical reac-
tive defenses such as contacting other networks, route filter-
ing, extensive peering and prefix de-aggregation are usually
preferred methods to mitigate hijacks; however, each has its
own significant limitations, ranging from very slow mitiga-
tion speeds (e.g., contacting other operators) to inefficient
mitigation (e.g., de-aggregation for /24 prefixes).
In terms of detection, we observe that operators mainly
rely on third parties, such as BGPmon. However, the level of
satisfaction varies wildly across operators. Moreover, most
of them are reluctant to perform similar outsourcing for the
mitigation of the hijacks themselves; in fact, there are mixed
feelings about the kind and amount of information theywould
be willing to disclose to the third party, as well as the in-
volved costs and technical and administrative overhead. The
speed and effectiveness of themitigation stage, as well as the
self-operability and low cost andmanagement overhead, are
of paramount importance; moreover, the detection stage is
required to generate few false positives, mandating high lev-
els of detection accuracy. The findings of this survey could
inform the design and implementation of new concepts and
methodologies, such as ARTEMIS [10, 23], as well as more
secure inter-domain routing protocols in general.
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Figure 2: Survey results – Knowledge and Experience with BGP Prefix Hijacking
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Figure 3: Survey results – Defenses against BGP Prefix Hijacking
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